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FOREWORD
HARRY M. CROSS*

The enactment of Initiative 2081 in the 1960 election authorizes
creation of joint tenancies in real and personal property in Washington generally. Many of the potential problems which may confront
Washington lawyers because of the general availability of the joint
tenancy device are discussed in this symposium. An orderly presentation of the arguments and identification of the particulars to be resolved
will be fostered by the effort of the Review editors in assembling the
material in this issue. I am sure that members of the Washington bar
will agree that we owe a substantial debt to the authors.
The discussions which follow reveal expectable differences between
the tasks of the counselor, the advocate and the title insurer. To the
extent that the informed lawyer is allowed to participate in a joint
tenancy transaction at its inception he will be able to meet many of the
requirements of the title insurer and minimize the likelihood of litigation, but until answers are provided either by decision or legislation
no joint tenancy transaction will be much insulated from litigation,
and at least two circumstances suggest that a substantial number of
unexpected court proceedings will develop in this area. The first is
the practical circumstance that many, if not most, of the joint tenancies
will be created without adequate, reliable information. The second is,
in a sense, the reverse: an apparently rather widely held belief by
laymen that the passage of the Initiative converted ownerships into
joint tenancies automatically. This belief appears to be applicable to
husband-wife ownerships, and administration of intestate estates and
controversies about successions may be more numerous in the future
because of the misapprehension.
The two Comments have a probable utility somewhat out of the
ordinary. Mrs. Lyness' discussion makes the important points that
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
'WVash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2; RCW 64.28. The text is quoted in n.1 of Mr.
Tully's article, infra at page 7.
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Washington's new "208" joint tenancy act should not affect the joint
"bank" account rules, and that in addition, the joint tenancy concepts
in common law form should not have controlling force in moulding the
multi-party account law. The article by Professor Kepner to which
Mrs. Lyness refers points out that in most jurisdictions the law of
these accounts has gone through several stages, finally settling into
its own pattern, borrowing from, perhaps, but not controlled by technical concepts developed in a different context. The Washington cases
reflect fragments of a similar pattern. If the multi-party account device is to be a useful one, this writer believes the controlling rules
should be "tailor-made" for the device and hopes that future cases
will reveal a developing pattern of "joint-and-survivor account" rules.'
Mr. Kremer's summary of the inter vivos relationships of co-owners
assembles information usually widely scattered. With a probable increase in the number of co-ownerships in which these problems
develop,' Washington lawyers will probably have much more occasion
than formerly to consider the points in this useful discussion.
Creation of a joint tenancy under the new law apparently will
require a writing of some sort." In the case of real property transactions
the Statute of Frauds already forces use of documents and the new
law merely adds the complexities of getting the intended form of
ownership. Mr. Tully analyzes the positions the title insurers plan
to take and, of course, indicates indirectly the difference between the
tasks of the counselor and the advocate. The "straw-man" conveyance
procedure ought to, and probably will, assure creation of the joint
tenancy when the initial transferor is one of the resulting joint tenants,
but it can be hoped that either legislation or decision (or both) will
make possible direct conversion into joint tenancy ownership without
"detouring" the title through the straw man. The presumption of a
community property ownership could apply to the straw man's temporary and technical title and the draftsman will need to insert phrasing that can immunize the transaction from the presumption. A
similar problem exists with respect to creditors of the straw man.
These possibilities among others indicate the desirability of permitting
the direct conversion into a joint tenancy. The New Hampshire case
2 See also NILES & WALsH, 2 AmmEiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.4 at 17 (Casner ed.

1952).

3 Probable, on the assumption that California's experience with the use of joint tenancy rather than community property form for husband-wife ownership may be repeated in Washington. See Mr. Griffith's article infra at Page 30.
4 Wash. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 2, § 1; RCW 64.28.010.
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Mr. Tully mentions does, as he says, have all the best of it, and there
appears to be nothing in the language of "208" which necessitates
adoption of common law procedures in the creation process. No doubt
the reader will identify many other points in this article at which the
tasks of the counselor and the advocate, and their positions, will differ.
As regards personal property the requirement of a writing will
probably, as a practical matter, present more difficulty. Initially the
possibility of using a "tracing" argument arises. For example, if an
automobile owned in joint tenancy (with appropriate documentary
evidence thereof) is sold, are the proceeds held in joint tenancy?
Must there be some written "transfer" document to establish that
the proceeds were acquired by the sellers in joint tenancy, or is a
tracing to the source sufficient?5 Or, assuming for this purpose that
there would be a technical joint tenancy in a bank account, suppose
money is withdrawn from a joint tenancy bank account and used to
pay for furniture. Is the furniture held in joint tenancy? There
might be a purpose on the part of the acquirers to continue the joint
tenancy despite the change in form of the asset, but the provision of
the new law may and perhaps does frustrate that purpose through
the requirements in section one, that "Joint tenancy may be created
by [a writing] when expressly declared therein to be a joint tenancy"
and in section two, that every multi-party interest created is something
other than a joint tenancy "unless declared in its creation to be a joint
tenancy, as provided in section 1." In California tracing will control,
but all depends upon the intention of the parties and no writing requirement exists.6 In Illinois where there is a writing requirement,
tracing does not appear to furnish any answer.'
Careful handling of the transaction would lead to preparation of
appropriate writings, but suppose the argument is over the offspring
of cattle owned in joint tenancy,' or the crops from land (or the
proceeds of sale of the crops) so owned. It may be that adequate
provision to control the character of ownership of the offspring or
crops could be made in the document of acquisition of the source
asset. There does not seem to be any other document that could do
rThe existence of a document to meet the writing requirement is more likely in the
land transaction even as to the transferor, and the "preservation" of the document by
recording, for example, is also more likely.
6 See, e.g., Fish v. Security-First Nat Bank, 31 Cal.2d 378, 189 P.2d 10 (1948).
7 Illinois Public Aid Comm'n v. Stille, 14 Ill.2d 344, 153 N.E.2d 59 (1958).
8 In re Ebdon, 98 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1950) ; Kauffman v. Stenger, 151 Pa. Super. 313,
30 A.2d 239 (1943) ; Note, 36 IowA L. RV.712 (1951).
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the task ordinarily; but the likelihood of the problem being faced in
this fashion is probably small.
The avoidance of "probate" which the proponents of the initiative
sought can require that all assets be held in joint tenancy. Is it
possible to accomplish this by some sort of a "blanket" instrument
covering existing and subsequently acquired assets? 9 The problem is
primarily of importance to husbands and wives. Washington lawyers
are familiar with the possibility of controlling the community or
separate property character of assets, both present and future."0 This
control rests upon recognition of the contracting power of the two persons; it would at first blush appear to reach the joint tenancy character
problem too, but section two of the act precludes such a result-any
multi-party holding is something other unless joint tenancy is created,
as required by section one, by a writing which declares it. Even as to
separate property the preference under section two is for a tenancy
in common.
Probably then, it will be only in the "poor man's will" area that the
survivorship feature of joint tenancy can accomplish much saving in
the event of death of one of the owners. In addition some convenience
may exist in getting joint tenancy corporate shares transferred. If,
however, the suggestions of the preceding paragraph are sound, the
house-car-bank account estates may be about the only ones likely to be
put outside of "probate" by joint tenancies, and even-here, what about
the furniture?
Joint tenancy estates that get into the death tax area may have both
more problems and more expenses than necessary, as Mr. Stacey's
article demonstrates. There seem to be almost innumerable articles
on the joint tenancy complications to estate planning and as to taxes
generally. Mr. Stacey's article will be a valuable guide and check list
for the Washington lawyer. A potential local quirk, brought to mind
by his discussion of gift tax complications, is the application to the
creation of a joint tenancy of the 1% real estate excise tax required
by the terms of RCW 28.45, the so-called real estate sales tax. The
definition of "sale" in that law is so broad that it is surprising what
9 This ought to be possible with respect to existing assets. Cunningham v. Norwegian Lutheran Church, 28 Wn.2d 953, 184 P.2d 834 (1947) (all of my property in
Snohomish county) ; Rennie v. Washington Trust Co., 140 Wash. 472, 249 Pac. 992
(1926) (gift of all I own).
"oE.g., Piles v. Bovee, 168 Wash. 538, 12 P2d 914 (1932) ; In re Brown's Estate,
29 Wn.2d 20, 185 P.2d 125 (1947); Kolmorgan v. Schaller, 51 Wn.2d 94, 316 P.2d 111,
67 A.L.R.2d 704 (1957). As a partial antidote to the last cited case, see 33 WAsH. L.
Rxv. 112 (1958).
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transactions are included, but at least the donative creation (through
the straw man detour) of a joint tenancy between the transferor
widow and her son has been declared by the attorney general not to
be taxable.11 The opinion cautiously states that it is not intended to be
applied to the situation where community property is transferred into
joint tenancy; it would appear that the analysis should be the same."
If Washington citizens use the joint tenancy device as commonly as
is apparently the case in California, for example, 3 the puzzlers identified by Messrs. Treadwell and Shulkin for Creditor-Debtor Relations
will probably require solution. Their discussion should prove invaluable in fostering reasonable and purposeful solutions to the "ordinary"
joint tenancy credit problems. The new law poses, as they point out,
its own nasty little problem in the proviso to section one: "That such
transfer shall not derogate from the rights of creditors." These authors
and Mr. Tully point out that the meaning of the proviso is not certain.
A technical twist on the interpretation of initiatives may complicate
the matter further. There is at least a suggestion as to the meaning
intended by the draftsmen of the Initiative in the title of the act, and
perhaps in the literature which promoted its passage, but can this
suggestion be considered? There is authority 4 that the title is no part
of the enactment; and notice that it does not appear in the codification
in RCW 64.28.
The creditor problems depend also on the separate or community
property character of the husband-wife ownerships. Washington's
recognition of separate and community debts, with appropriate differences in the scope of liability, obviously makes the character of the
inter vivos ownership important whatever may be the possibilities of
ownership after the death of one spouse. If no complications develop
until one spouse dies it probably doesn't make any difference what
the two-party property relationship was previously. If complications
do develop, the differences in voluntary and involuntary manipulative
power over community property and separate property, and the usual
power of one joint tenant to act independently, compel a determination
that joint tenancy is not a form of community property ownership.
At the death of one spouse problems of immunity of the survivor
11 Ops. ATr'y. GEtN. 86 (Wash. 1961-62).
12 This does not suggest any immunity to gift tax liability.
13 See note 22 of Mr. Griffith's article and the accompanying discussion infra at
Page 34.

14 Senior Citizens League, Inc. v. Dep't of Social Security, 38 Wn.2d 142, 172-73,
228 P2d 478, 494-95 (1951). See also, State ex rel. O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wn.2d
454, 478, 319 P.2d 828, 839 (1957). (Weaver, J., dissenting.)
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from obligations not incurred by the survivor, full ownership of the
assets in the survivor, and testamentary power of the decedent
must be resolved. Making the large assumption that the writing
requirements will not preclude showing an intention to have some
community property attributes and some joint tenancy attributes so
that there may be community property in joint tenancy form, as Mr.
Griffith suggests has become possible in California," the question
arises whether there is a sufficient utility in distorting concepts, as
this writer sees it, to achieve a shift of ownership possibility at death
which may lead to a "deluge of cases" as Mr. Griffith points out has
occurred in California. It is possible that the current studies of the
state bar committee considering the probate code will lead to legislation largely meeting the "poor man's will" problem by affording some
more inexpensive way to settle small estates. It is also possible that
"community property in joint tenancy form" may be rationalized as
a specialized form of the community property agreement"8 under
RCW 26.16.120 so that the surviving spouse will by this specialized
statutory agreement become sole owner, but subject to the ordinary
community property obligations. Even California's confused development apparently does not preclude testamentary disposition or immunize the assets in the survivor's hand from creditors who could
reach the asset were both owners still alive. This possible development
in Washington will be interesting to watch. It is the writer's hope that
it will be nipped in the bud, else the Washington citizens may harvest
an unusual crop of litigation. The very limited extent to which there
is any effect given to the joint tenancy aspect of the hybrid ownership
Mr. Griffith identifies, is revealed in his study which appears in the
STANFORD LAW REVIEW,' 7 and the usefulness of its importation into
Washington would depend, in part, upon a similarity of rules in the
two states as to matters to which the new concept would apply. That
similarity does not exist.
In a sense, the total discussion of this foreword, the articles and the
comments of this symposium only hint at the problems which probably
will arise in the development of the joint tenancy law for Washington.
Even so, this issue of the Review will probably be unusually wellthumbed as time passes.
15

Discussed particularly in Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form,

14 STAN. L. REv. 87 (1961).
16 The community property agreement has no counterpart in other community property states.
17 Griffith, Community Propertyin Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REv. 87 (1961).

